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Why the Small Things in Life Matter:
Philosophy of Biology from
the Microbial Perspective
Maria Şerban and Sara Green*
Maureen A. O’Malley, Philosophy of Microbiology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press ð2014Þ, x1269 pp., $30.39 ðpaperÞ.
Introduction
There is plenty of room at the bottom. ðRichard FeynmanÞ
And it is not only for physicists. In her book, Philosophy of Microbiology,
Maureen O’Malley invites philosophers of biology to look more closely
and more intensely at the lessons that microbes can teach them. Even those
who are not easily impressed by the scientiﬁc venues that this book ventures
into cannot remain entirely immune to the breadth of debates and questions,
both current and historical, that the book addresses in less than 280 pages.
O’Malley’s daring hypothesis is that looking “at the bottom” may not only
hold important answers to vexing philosophical questions but also lead to
the reorientation of philosophical discussions and to the reconceptualiza-
tion of central topics in biology. A general lesson of the book is that it mat-
ters not only what ðphilosophicalÞ questions we are asking but also where we
are looking for the answers.
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The six main chapters of the book construct a case for taking seriously
the littlest of the living things: microbes. O’Malley weaves four fresh per-
spectives into the arguments of the book in support of her general case for
the philosophical relevance of a microbial focus: biodiversity, biogeochem-
istry, evolutionary history, and symbiotic collaboration. The philosophical
and scientiﬁc debates surveyed in the book span a variety of topics that are
carefully knit into the fabric of the book, with various threads running through
several chapters. In this review, we focus on one major theme that resurfaces
at various points in the dialectic of the book connecting the arguments pre-
sented in all six chapters: microbes as model systems within biology itself
and for philosophical accounts of biology-related topics. Emphasizing model
systems allows us to assess two important claims that O’Malleymakes about
the impact of a microbial focus on broader philosophical questions such as
“What is life?” “What is the unit of evolution?” or “How are biological or-
ganisms organized?” and on philosophical methodology in general.
Microbes as Model Systems. O’Malley shows how both historical and con-
temporary perspectives on the ﬁeld of biology support the idea that mi-
crobes are one of the main entry points into the study of many different
aspects of the functioning, organization, and evolution of biological organ-
isms. She highlights two features of microbial systems that are responsible
for their widespread use: their experimental tractability and their capacity to
represent various properties or processes observed in all forms of life. More
concretely, she points out that a host of theoretical accounts developed in
genomics, systems biology, and molecular biology, as well as experimental
approaches to evolution and ecology, are premised on the assumption that
microbes exhibit general features of molecular structure and function, repro-
duction, variation, heritability, and ﬁtness that characterize all forms of life.
Drawing mainly on practice-driven observations, O’Malley’s book con-
structs a multifaceted argument for why philosophical accounts that typi-
cally take humans or other multicellular organisms as their starting point
should pay more attention to microbes. Perhaps the strongest claim in the
book is that microbes are superior to macrobes when it comes to illumi-
nating philosophical analyses of topics such as biological classiﬁcation,
evolution, ecology, or the nature of life itself. This claim is not premised on
any strong assumptions about the “unity of life” or about microbes being
general “elementary particles” for biological accounts. Rather, O’Malley
shows that a careful study of the scientiﬁc practices reveals the importance
of microbes for almost all biological research and argues that a shift of focus
to microorganisms can be ðconstructivelyÞ disruptive to many assumptions
that philosophers of science have long taken for granted. The book thereby
calls for a more reﬂective choice of model systems on which philosophers
base their conceptual accounts. We ﬁnd her strategy particularly interesting
ESSAY REVIEWS 153
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.058 on February 04, 2016 04:25:33 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
because it pushes philosophy to play a more engaged role in substantial
debates that arise within microbiology itself ðand potentially in other ﬁelds
of biology as wellÞ.
We understand O’Malley’s strategy as a divide et impera and “bottom-
up” approach that consists in identifying and evaluating the distinct epi-
stemic roles that microbial model systems play in different investigative
contexts ðe.g., evidential support, prediction, control, representation, uni-
ﬁcation, explanationÞ. This approach makes it more concrete what philo-
sophical analysis can bring to the table: a critical and comparative survey
of the variety of epistemological functions that microbial model systems
can play ðand have playedÞ in biological theorizing and experimenting.
Moreover, O’Malley argues that such a philosophical analysis can be truly
informative only if it draws on the lessons afforded by both the successes
and the failures of using microbial systems in biological research. We men-
tion here some of the most interesting cases.
Experimental evolutionary biology is one ﬁeld in which microbes play a
key role in testing causal hypotheses about different evolutionary scenarios.
Stimulated by the inspiring work of Richard Lenski on tens of thousands
of generations of E. coli, experimentation on microbial model systems has
developed over the years into a powerful method that can corroborate,
extend, and sometimes challenge theoretical hypotheses about evolutionary
processes otherwise supported by the comparative method and historical
narratives. In addition to this evidential role, O’Malley suggests that these
experimental scenarios can have an even deeper impact in sharpening or
modifying our understanding of broad general features of biological phe-
nomena such as evolvability, hypermutation, the interplay of neutral to adap-
tive evolutionary processes, convergence, and kin selection. Chapters 1, 4,
and 6 explore these conceptual changes in some detail, although often the ar-
guments function as “hooks” that draw the reader into the search for a deeper
understanding of the dynamics of these biological ideas.
O’Malley’s discussion of models of evolutionary transition provides an-
other occasion to explore the diversity of epistemic roles of model microbial
systems. Whereas approaches to evolution starting with animals or plants
typically emphasize a hierarchical view of evolution with increasing com-
plexity over time, this hierarchy looks much “ﬂatter” in light of microbial
diversiﬁcation ðcf. Sterelny 1999Þ. Similarly, the evidence in support of lat-
eral gene transfer and endosymbiosis in microbial cultures questions the
basis for seeing single lineages as units for selection and draws attention to
the consequences of adopting the “tree of life” metaphor and to the impor-
tance of multilineage collaboration in evolution. This supports the idea that
microbes as model systems can play an inferential role at a quite abstract level
of biological theories, proving the plausibility of alternative theoretical con-
ceptions of evolvability, sociality, multicellularity, and communication.
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A quite different epistemic role for microbes in biological research is
illustrated by the success of yeast experiments in evolving multicellularity
in vitro ðRatcliff et al. 2012Þ, a case discussed at length in chapter 6. Fol-
lowing Levy and Curie ð2014Þ, O’Malley suggests that in these investi-
gative contexts microbial systems represent a paradigmatic case of mod-
eling because they are used as “surrogates for a general process, rather than
to make empirical extrapolations to related organisms” ðO’Malley, 184Þ. In
other words, the types of inferences drawn in these contexts are not mere
empirical generalizations because they do not exploit analogies between par-
ticular ðpairs ofÞ systems but rather abstract away from the experimental mi-
crobial case to hypothesize general principles that occur in a wide variety of
systems. However, the discussions of these issues in chapter 6 works more
like a teaser for future debates concerning the epistemic roles of microbial
model organisms.
O’Malley dedicates a more extensive analysis to the heuristic role of mi-
crobial model organisms. She argues that as experimental models, microbial
systems can be used to show what biological patterns or phenomena are
possible and how they come about ðcf. Dykhuizen and Davies 1980Þ. In this
function, O’Malley argues that microbial systems work as intermediaries
between mathematical models and ﬁeld observations, sharing features with
both types of epistemic constructions. The list of examples of successful uses
of microbial model systems that exhibit this function include bacterial che-
motactic research, social evolution, and the investigation of different prin-
ciples of cognition ðcf. O’Malley, 184–89Þ. More provocatively, O’Malley
suggests that the heuristic role of model microorganisms warrants some
degree of continuity between these different areas of research. In this, she
follows the proposal of the early molecular approaches to bacterial chemo-
taxis that conceived this phenomenon as an entry point to the study of sen-
sory behavior and even to neurobiology and psychology ðe.g., Adler 1966Þ.
Alas, for those expecting a more concrete proposal emerging from these
claims, O’Malley provides no more than a bold invitation at considering
how these themes might be further connected with debates in other areas of
science and philosophy ðe.g., philosophy of mind and cognitive neurosci-
enceÞ. This line of argument nevertheless has some constructive implica-
tions concerning questions about philosophical methodology to which we
will return below.
Life. How do these different epistemic roles of microbial model organisms
shape our philosophical analysis of general concepts such as biological
organization, function, and life? At the most general level, the assumption
that microbes ðhave features thatÞ are representative of all forms of life
supports a continuity of life perspective that in turn justiﬁes the study of the
organization and functioning of living things within shared scientiﬁc frame-
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works. Can this perspective also make room for understanding the ma-
jor differences between diverse forms of life? O’Malley argues that it does
and that focusing on microbes as objects of biological investigation does
not privilege any unique hierarchy of living things. In particular, she stresses
that philosophy of microbiology can help correct some of the dangerous
consequences of adopting a human-centered view of life blindly. O’Malley
shows thatmicrobiology can offer a fresh perspective on classical discussions
of the nature of life in at least two ways: by reorienting questions concern-
ing the origin of life to current research inspired by microbiological theories
and by challenging the dominant methodological individualism that tends
to place bigger organisms at the center of our reﬂections about the nature
of life.
More speciﬁcally, attention to microbes results in blurring many of the
boundaries that are typically taken for granted, even when it comes to what
an organism or a human body is. The study of microbes brings out the col-
laborative nature of metabolism in a variety of systems, for example, how
human gut bacteria are intrinsic to human health and how multilineage
collectives make up important parts of ecosystems. This community ori-
entation with emphasis on collaboration feeds back into philosophical dis-
cussions of life in which autonomy is typically taken to be a central deﬁning
feature of life ðsee also Dupré and O’Malley 2009Þ. The increased focus
on metabolism and metagenomics for understanding life and evolution also
brings ðbackÞ biochemistry to the center of philosophical debates in which
molecular biology and evolutionary biology recently have been the main
“model ﬁelds.”
The discussion of the concept of life illustrates a more general moral of
O’Malley’s book, namely, that microbiology has the potential to bring to the
philosophical scene a set of new perspectives and questions that challenge
our received ways of thinking about central notions in biology. In addition
to the promise of conceptual clariﬁcation, the analyses sparkled by micro-
biological research can have important social and cultural implications on
how we think about the organization of scientiﬁc disciplines, their impact
on conservational policies, and our general way of conceiving our place in
the living world.
Methodology. O’Malley explicitly follows what Turner ð2011Þ calls a
“science-ﬁrst” or “bottom-up” methodology and acknowledges the difﬁcul-
ties for this approach of going beyond a descriptive reiteration of scientiﬁc
practice. The cautious route taken in this book will probably be unsatisfac-
tory to some readers who are expecting to ﬁnd elaborate theses about how
speciﬁc philosophical accounts would look like from a microbial perspec-
tive. Yet, it is important to note that this practice-oriented approach has im-
portant complementary virtues to a philosophy-ﬁrst methodology. O’Mal-
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ley’s aim is to open a whole new research ﬁeld in philosophy of science by
showing how microbiology can breathe new life into both biological and
philosophical debates. The book also has profound metaphilosophical im-
plications. The author calls for a reﬂection among philosophers on their
choices of “model organisms” or “model ﬁelds” when developing their ac-
counts of living systems or of biological research practice. In this sense,
starting with the scientiﬁc practice has normative implications for philo-
sophical methodology itself. O’Malley shows how some of the most basic
assumptions of philosophical classiﬁcations can be questioned by looking “at
the bottom.” Avoiding the inertia of received ideas and unquestioned as-
sumptions ðno matter from what ﬁeld of inquiry they originateÞ should be
the continuous and perpetual task of any philosophical enterprise, and the
Philosophy of Microbiology is a compelling reminder of this.
Another important methodological stance taken in the book concerns the
positioning of the philosophy of microbiology with respect to philosophy
of biology and philosophy of science more generally. O’Malley claims that
philosophy of microbiology can act as the middle man between these two
ﬁelds, and the book exempliﬁes how it is possible to discuss philosophical
topics in a way that is more accessible to a scientiﬁc audience.
This brings us to the question of who is the intended audience of this
book. We think that, despite its sometimes technical biological language,
the book is approachable to a wide audience on both sides of the philo-
sophical/scientiﬁc divide. In fact, the book can be read as an effort to bridge
what might well be an imaginary gap between the two areas of inquiry,
showing that wonder and the commitment to try various exploratory strat-
egies to unlocking the mysteries of nature is the common source of these
two broad enterprises.
Conclusion. We think that the debates surveyed in O’Malley’s book af-
ford important lessons about modeling and explanation in microbiology
that can be extended to other ﬁelds of investigation as well. The book leaves
open lots of the questions it raises, while the main role of its author is to
guide the reader in seeing as clearly as possible the various perspectives
available to her. We see this as an open invitation to participate in the
discussion of the numerous topics that Philosophy of Microbiology ven-
tures into.
Focusing on the very small, Maureen O’Malley’s book opens up a large
space of conceptual possibilities available to both philosophers and scien-
tists alike. The author convinces us that microbes can no longer be “the
invisible elephant in the room” since that puts us in the dangerous epistemic
position of missing out on an exciting world of knowledge and on very
valuable tools for reﬁning our philosophical and scientiﬁc views of the
biological realm.
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